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Abstract
Many organisms live in populations structured by space and by class, exhibit plastic re-
sponses to their social partners, and are subject to non-additive ecological and fitness effects.
Social evolution theory has long recognized that all of these factors can lead to different selection
pressures but has only recently attempted to synthesize how these factors interact. Using models
for both discrete and continuous phenotypes, we show that analyzing these factors in a consistent
framework reveals that they interact with one another in ways previously overlooked. Specifi-
cally, behavioral responses (reciprocity), genetic relatedness, and synergy interact in non-trivial
ways that cannot be easily captured by simple summary indices of assortment. We demonstrate
the importance of these interactions by showing how they have been neglected in previous syn-
thetic models of social behavior both within and between species. These interactions also affect
the level of behavioral responses that can evolve in the long run; proximate biological mecha-
nisms are evolutionarily stable when they generate enough responsiveness relative to the level
of responsiveness that exactly balances the ecological costs and benefits. Given the richness of
social behavior across taxa, these interactions should be a boon for empirical research as they
are likely crucial for describing the complex relationship linking ecology, demography, and social
behavior.
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1. Introduction
Explaining the evolution of social behaviors has been a goal of evolutionary theory going back
to Darwin’s time. The modern theory for the origin of social behaviors started with the seminal
work of Hamilton (1964a,b), which showed that genetic relatedness has a profound influence on
evolutionary dynamics. Later work added other significant factors, starting with conditional and
responsive behaviors (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) and extending to non-additive
fitness interactions (Queller, 1984, 1985). Theorists analyzed many models that apply and extend
these mechanisms (e.g., extending reciprocity to include indirect responses, Nowak and Sigmund,
1998). At the same time, empirical researchers tested the role of various mechanisms developed in
the theoretical literature (e.g., Queller and Strassmann, 1998; Hughes et al., 2008; Schino et al.,
2009).
Whereas early discussions of social evolution usually pitted one mechanism against another, re-
cent efforts are increasingly focused on synthesizing and integrating the various pathways of social
evolution (e.g., Marshall and Rowe, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Nowak,
2006; West et al., 2007; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009; Queller, 2011). This is perhaps the surest sign
that social evolution theory has entered a mature phase. These efforts at synthesis are not always
without controversy, but they have served to illuminate the connections between various models
devised over the decades. In this paper, we aim to contribute to this synthesis by focusing specif-
ically on the relation between three important concepts: assortment of genotypes (relatedness),
behavioral responsiveness (e.g., reciprocity), and non-additive (e.g., synergistic) effects of social
behaviors on fitness. These topics have of course been written about in the past; yet, how these
concepts relate to one another is still not well understood.
Two of the most fundamental mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are responsive (and
conditional) behaviors such as reciprocity, and genetic assortment, or relatedness, between individu-
als (Lehmann and Keller, 2006a). Both factors are clearly in operation in many social interactions.
Cooperative breeding, for example, almost always involves interactions with relatives of varying
degree. At the same time, most cooperatively breeding species also exhibit conditional behav-
ior; for example, non-helpers might get evicted from the breeding group (Balshine-Earn et al.,
1998). Likewise, reciprocal food-sharing among vampire bats can occur amongst relatives as well
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as non-relatives (Wilkinson, 1984).
Non-additive interactions between individual phenotypes also play a prominent role in social
evolution. Sometimes, the non-additivity is a direct function of organismal metabolism, as in the
case of the plant pathogen Agrobacterium tumefaciens, which induces infected hosts to produce
opines that can be used as a resource only by those cells that also carry the virulence plasmid
(White et al., 2007). In other cases, the ecological context might create non-additive payoffs. For
example, in the penduline tits (Remiz pendulous), one or both of the parents desert the nest after
eggs are laid. Data on breeding success suggests that the reason for this behavior is in part that a
single parent has better than even chance of raising the clutch (Szentirmai et al., 2007). Hence, the
second parent adds less to breeding success than the first parent, meaning a negative non-additivity.
It has been argued that the opposite is true for many bird species with biparental care (Weso lowski,
1994). It is worth noting that in both of these examples, as perhaps with most instances of non-
additive interactions between phenotypes, the traits in question are plastic. For example, the
Agrobacterium pathways that induce opine production are not expressed constitutively but depend
on quorum-sensing instead (White et al., 2007). Likewise, the male and female decisions to desert
in penduline tits appear context-dependent; the same individual can care or desert according to
factors such as brood size (Persson and O¨hrstro¨m, 1989; Valera et al., 1997).
Yet, despite copious theoretical work on the individual importance of conditional behaviors,
genetic assortment, and non-additive payoffs, the interplay between these mechanisms remained
relatively unexplored until recently (Queller, 1985; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Fletcher and Zwick,
2006; Foster and Wenseleers, 2006; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009; McGlothlin et al., 2010; Queller,
2011; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012). Much of this recent work neglects to systematically study
the interactions between these factors (with the notable exception of Lehmann and Keller, 2006a;
McGlothlin et al., 2010; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012), which we show can lead to an incomplete
or incorrect view of how selection affects social behaviors. Moreover, properly accounting for these
interactions allows us to gain novel insights into when conditional behaviors should be evolutionarily
stable and to empirically assess the level of responsiveness across demographically diverse species.
Our paper begins with two models: first, we use a discrete-action model to clarify the rela-
tionship between genetic assortment (e.g., relatedness), behavioral responses (a generic notion of
reciprocity), and synergistic or non-additive interactions. Second, we generalize the results of the
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discrete-action model by presenting a population genetic model for the evolution of a continuous
trait in a structured population, where the structure can be due to any combination of age, stage,
sex, or spatial location. Using these models, we show how previous analyses that do not system-
atically track the effect of behavioral responses (Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009; Queller, 2011) have
neglected a crucial interaction between responsiveness and relatedness (McGlothlin et al., 2010;
Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012). Rather than combining additively in the equation for the effect of
selection (Queller, 2011), relatedness and responsiveness interact through a product term that im-
plies each of these assortment mechanisms contributes distinct effects (contra Fletcher and Doebeli,
2009). We also show this crucial interaction to be missing in models of interspecific mutualisms
(Foster and Wenseleers, 2006), which leads to difficulties in interpreting mechanisms that stabilize
mutualisms.
More generally, our discrete model allows us to show how synergistic interactions can affect
the evolutionary stability of social behaviors and even change the payoff structure of the game
resulting in a different game entirely. This is important because helping is more likely to evolve
in Hawk-Dove (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) or Stag-Hunt (Skyrms, 2001) games than in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Using our continuous-trait model, we show that proximate physiological
or psychological mechanisms evolve in the long run only when they produce “enough” responsiveness
relative to the responsiveness level that exactly balances the demographic costs and benefits of the
behavior. This evolutionarily stable level of responsiveness is a function of both the absolute level of
relatedness and the interaction between relatedness and responsiveness. Finally, we highlight in the
discussion how recent work in quantitative genetics that measures relatedness and responsiveness
requires a proper accounting of the interaction of these two mechanisms.
2. Discrete action model
We consider a 2x2 game played repeatedly between two individuals a large number of times.
We take the game to be symmetric for ease of exposition, but this assumption can be relaxed with
no consequence for our main argument. Label the two actions C and D. Rather than focusing on
a particular conditional strategy (e.g., the Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981)), we model
a wide range of propensities to respond to one’s partner. We assume that each individual i has
two traits: ai, which is the action (C or D) that the individual i intrinsically “prefers”, and ρi,
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the probability that individual i overrides its intrinsic preference and reciprocates its opponent’s
action in the last round. Hence, in common parlance, ai corresponds to whether individuals are
cooperators or defectors, and ρi denotes the degree to which individuals are reciprocators. Both
traits are genetically encoded; we take ai to be binary and ρi to be a continuous trait between 0 and
1. A straightforward extension of this model could treat ai as a continuous trait by interpreting it
as the intrinsic probability of playing C vs. D.
Consider an interaction between an intrinsic cooperator and an intrinsic defector (i.e., a1 = C
and a2 = D). Suppose at stage t, player 1 (the C-type) played C and player 2 (the D-type) also
played C (because he was reciprocating cooperation in the previous round). We label this situation
as (C,C), where the elements correspond to the first and second players’ actions, respectively.
Let us label the response coefficients of the two individuals as ρc and ρd in according with intrinsic
preferences for C andD, respectively. In that case, the probability that they will keep playing (C,C)
at stage t+ 1 is the probability that the D-type individual keeps reciprocating, i.e., ρd. Similarly,
the probability that the t+ 1 stage will result in (C,D) is 1− ρd, as this is the probability that the
D-type will revert to his intrinsic preference. Finally, the probabilities of playing (D,C) and (D,D)
at t+1 given the actions at t is zero, since the C-type player will always play C regardless of whether
she plays her intrinsic preference or reciprocates. In a similar way, we can work out the probabilities
of playing any action pair at t+1 conditional on the action pair at t, which is summarized with the
transition matrix M = [mij ], where mij gives the probability of being in state j at t+ 1 when the
game was in state i at t, and states are ordered as {(C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D)}. So, m11 = ρd,
m12 = (1−ρd), etc.. We assume that the game is played for a very large number of periods with no
discounting, so that the proportion of time each pair of actions is played is given by the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain M. Taking the dominant left-eigenvector of M and normalizing
it, we find the stationary distribution of the game between a C-type and a D-type individual, pi,
to be
pi =
(
(1− ρc)2ρd , (1− ρc)(1− ρd) , (1− ρc)ρc(1− ρd)ρd , ρc(1− ρd)2
)
(1− ρcρd)−2 . (1)
The expected payoff of a C-type player from playing with a D-type player is the fraction of time
spent at each outcome (given by the elements of pi) multiplied by the payoff to her from that
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outcome. Suppose that the stage game is an additive Prisoner’s Dilemma: cooperation yields a
benefit of b to the partner, at a net cost of c to the cooperator. Defection carries no cost and yields
no benefit. Thus, the expected payoff to a C-type player when playing with a D-type, wCD, is
given by
wCD =
(1− ρc)(bρd − c)
1− ρcρd . (2)
With a similar calculation, we find the expected payoff to a D-type from playing with a C-type to
be
wDC =
(1− ρc)(b− cρd)
1− ρcρd . (3)
The expected payoff to a C-type from playing with another C-type is trivial; since both players
start with (C,C) and keep playing these actions, wCC = b− c. Similar reasoning yields wDD = 0.
In order to determine which type of individual is preferred by natural selection, we calculate
the condition when the frequency of intrinsic cooperators with responsiveness ρc increases in a
population with intrinsic defectors of responsiveness ρd. Suppose that some mechanism (e.g., pop-
ulation viscosity, kin-recognition, or greenbeards) causes cooperators to assort themselves so that
an intrinsic cooperator interacts with another intrinsic cooperator with probability rc; likewise,
intrinsic defectors assort among themselves with probability rd. When not assorting specifically
with their own types, individuals are paired with a partner randomly chosen from the population
(this is analogous to the classic assumption concerning populations with related individuals; see
equation 1 in Rousset and Billiard, 2000). A full description of the dynamic of frequency change in
the population would require a specification of the mechanism that generates assortment and how
it depends on the frequency of genotypes. However, we can leave this unspecified if we only require
a qualitative picture of frequency change over the course of a single generation.
Given our assumptions above and that the frequency of the intrinsic cooperative genotype is q,
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the expected fitnesses of an intrinsic cooperator and an intrinsic defector are, respectively,
WC = (rc + (1− rc)q)wCC + (1− rc)(1− q)wCD and
WD = (1− rd)q wDC + (rd + (1− rd)(1− q)wDD .
(4)
The condition for an increase of intrinsic cooperators is WC −WD > 0, which leads to
b
c
>
1− (1− q)ρc − qρd + (1− q)rcρc (1− ρd) + qrd (1− ρc) ρd
qρc + (1− q)ρd + (1− q)rc (1− ρd) + qrd (1− ρc)− ρcρd . (5)
Three special cases help illustrate the meaning of this equation. First, suppose individuals do not
respond to each other, ρc = ρd = 0, and that the assortment probabilities are equal, rc = rd = r.
In this case, condition (5) becomes bc >
1
r , which of course is Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964a).
Second, suppose both the intrinsic cooperators and defectors have the same responsiveness, ρc =
ρd = ρ, and assortment is zero, rc = rd = 0. Then, condition (5) simplifies to
b
c >
1
ρ , which is
equivalent to other rules for the evolution of responsiveness (Akc¸ay et al., 2009) and reciprocity
(Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Andre´ and Day, 2007). Finally, giving intrinsic cooperators and
defectors the same assortment probability and responsiveness, rc = rd = r and ρc = ρd = ρ, yields
b
c
>
1 + rρ
r + ρ
, (6)
which is analogous to equation (4) in Lehmann and Keller (2006a). In condition (6), the assortment
coefficient r (which is now analogous to relatedness) and responsiveness ρ have symmetric effects
on the increase condition but remain distinct components because both the product and sum of ρ
and r appear. Not coincidentally, expression (6) is identical in structure to the condition for an
evolutionary increase in cooperation we have previously derived for continuous public goods games
(Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012) and to other previously derived results (Lehmann and Keller, 2006a;
McGlothlin et al., 2010).
It is interesting to contrast our analysis with an earlier model by Marshall and Rowe (2003)
that addresses a similar problem. In this model, five unlinked loci determine the initial strategy
of an individual and the responses to each combination of strategies by the two players in the
previous round. Marshall and Rowe measure reciprocity with the locus that determines whether an
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individual retaliates by defecting after it cooperated and its opponent defected (a (C,D) outcome in
our notation). They find selection for retaliation decreases as relatedness increases. Later, Marshall
(2009) finds that this is due to negative non-additivity in the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game they use. In contrast to these models, we model reciprocity as a generalized propensity to
do what the opponent did in the last round regardless of what the focal individual did previously.
As such, our results are not readily comparable, since in our model, the four conditional responses
(one to each potential outcome) are inherently linked to each other. Thus while selection for
retaliating after a (C,D)-round might decrease with increased relatedness in our model (because
relatedness favors increased cooperation), this decrease is counteracted by increased selection to
copy the opponent’s behavior after a (C,C) outcome.
3. Population genetic model
We now turn to a population genetic framework that will allow us to generalize the above results
to interactions among an arbitrary number of individuals who may be from different demographic
classes (e.g., males and females, queens and workers, etc.). A population genetic model will also
allow us to gain insights into how the long-term evolutionary stability of social behaviors depends
on the ecological costs and benefits and the proximate mechanisms of behavior. At the same time,
such generality involves a significant increase in the complexity of the model, and hence a different
set of simplifying assumptions are necessary.
In particular, we are interested in determining when a mutant allele that codes for some phe-
notype with social effects will, on average, increase in frequency in a population and reach fixation.
The proper quantity to calculate in this case is the fixation probability of the mutant allele (Rousset,
2003). For structured populations, the fixation probability may be impossible to obtain analyt-
ically, so we follow a standard approach that approximates that probability using a first-order
Taylor-series expansion in δ, which is the difference between the mutant and resident phenotypes
(Rousset and Billiard, 2000; Rousset and Ronce, 2004). Population genetics theory shows that the
first-order term in the expansion is sufficient to calculate the standard conditions for the evolution-
ary stability of phenotypes (Rousset and Billiard, 2000; Rousset and Ronce, 2004). Moreover, this
first-order term is proportional to a quantity that is much easier to calculate called the “selection
gradient”, which is the derivative of the expected change in the frequency of the mutant allele with
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respect to δ or d∆q/dδ. More intuitively, we can think of ∆q ≈ (d∆q/dδ) δ when δ is small. This
means that the sign of the selection gradient d∆q/dδ tells us when the mutant allele is expected
to increase or decrease in frequency or, in terms of fixation probability, when the mutant allele is
more or less likely than a neutral allele to fix in the population.
To obtain the selection gradient, d∆q/dδ, we first write a general expression for ∆q in a
class structured model using standard theory in population genetics and evolutionary demography
(Taylor, 1990; Charlesworth, 1994; Caswell, 2001; Rousset and Ronce, 2004). We do this using an
“individually” centered approach that was popularized in population genetics by the Price equation
(Price, 1972, 1970). The general expressions for ∆q and d∆q/dδ are derived in Appendix B in the
Supporting Information (equations B.1 and B.2, respectively). While general, these expressions do
not allow us to understand the interplay between behavioral and demographic mechanisms because
we need to specify how the phenotype affects behavior and how behavior affects fitness.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume a relatively simple social interaction that is unaf-
fected by the class structure (though class structure can still affect genetic relatedness). Assume
that each individual in each class participates in a single social interaction over the course of its life-
time with n− 1 other individuals from the same class (e.g., members of a patch interact together).
Each individual chooses actions in this social interaction (e.g., an amount of effort in some helping
behavior). Over the course of the social interaction, individuals are assumed to interact with one
another many times, and their actions are assumed to reach some equilibrium value (Akc¸ay et al.,
2009; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012) due to a negotiation process (McNamara et al., 1999; Andre´
and Day, 2007; Akc¸ay et al., 2009). This equilibrium action is a∗k for individual k and could, for
example, measure the amount of effort individual k invests in helping its social partners at the
conclusion of a negotiation over this amount. If we perturb this equilibrium by changing the ac-
tion of individual k, we can measure the effect of this perturbation on the action of individual m
by ρkm =
∂a∗m
∂a∗k
, which is the response coefficient ρ from section 2 (Akc¸ay et al., 2009; Akc¸ay and
Van Cleve, 2012).
The negotiation process is driven by some proximate behavioral mechanism whose biological
components (e.g., neurological structures) are genetically determined (whereas actions themselves
are not inherited). For simplicity, we assume that a single phenotype p characterizes the proximate
mechanism, and it is the evolution of this phenotype that we track with equation (B.1). As an
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example, the phenotype could be a measure of hormone function in some brain region associated
with cooperative behavior (see Soares et al., 2010, for a recent review). The behavioral mechanism
influences the negotiation of equilibrium actions, and we can measure this effect with
∂a∗k
∂pm
, which is
the effect of individual m’s phenotype on the action of individual k. This derivative could represent
the effect of a change in hormone function in individual m on the amount of effort individual k
invests in helping. The response coefficient can then be expressed as a function of these derivatives:
ρkm =
∂a∗m
∂a∗k
= ∂a
∗
m
∂pk
/
∂a∗k
∂pk
. Thus, response coefficients depend on the behavioral mechanism and the
phenotypes of the individuals involved in the social interaction.
When the social interaction concludes, we assume that individuals obtain payoffs as a function
of their equilibrium action and the equilibrium actions of their social partners. We assume this
payoff determines the fertility of each individual in the interaction (and affects no other fitness
component); for example, an individual’s fertility might be determined by the net calories it obtains
from participating in group hunting activities where it expends calories when it helps the hunt and
it obtains calories when prey are captured by itself or its partners. An individual’s fertility is
denoted by f(pk) for individual k. We can define the “costs” (c) and “benefits” (b) of the social
interaction in terms of the affect of actions on fertility where −c = ∂f∂a∗• and “•” represents the
focal individual and b = ∂f∂a∗◦ for some other individual “◦”. Given these assumptions, we show in
Appendix B in the Supporting Information that the selection gradient d∆q/dδ is proportional to
S = bρ(n− 1)− c︸ ︷︷ ︸
“direct” effect
+ r (n− 1) [b (1 + ρ(n− 2))− ρc]︸ ︷︷ ︸
“indirect” effect
, (7)
where ρ is the response coefficient in a resident population monomorphic for the phenotype p and b
and c are evaluated at the resident phenotypic value p. This result was previously derived by Akc¸ay
and Van Cleve (2012) and is analogous to expressions found in McGlothlin et al. (2010). The first
term in (7) is the “direct” effect on the fertility of a focal individual of its own phenotype and actions,
whereas the second term is the “indirect” effect on the focal individual of the actions and phenotypes
of its social partners. It is important to note that equation (7) is essentially a rearrangement of
Hamilton’s classic rule (Hamilton, 1964a) where the effect of local competition due to kin is moved
from the benefit and cost terms into the scaled relatedness-coefficient r (Queller, 1994; Rousset
and Ronce, 2004; Rousset, 2004; Lehmann and Rousset, 2010). We derive an expression for r in
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Appendix B in the Supporting Information.
Assuming that the phenotype p corresponds to investment in a cooperative behavior in a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma type of interaction, the condition for an increase in the level of cooperation derived
from equation (7) is S > 0 or
b
c
>
1 + rρ(n− 1)
(n− 1)(r + ρ+ (n− 2)rρ) . (8)
Condition (8) is the n-player analog of (6). Even for arbitrarily large interaction groups (n large),
the symmetry between relatedness r and responsiveness ρ is maintained. This reinforces the notion
that relatedness and responsiveness are distinct causal factors that interact synergistically and
cannot be both replaced by a single index of “assortment” (Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009). Moreover,
social interactions with more than two individuals (n > 2) introduce an additional product of
relatedness and responsiveness; this product is scaled by b(n − 1)(n − 2) and effectively accounts
for the benefit a focal individual obtains when its relatives affect the behavior of a third party that
interacts with the focal.
Although we derive equations (7) and (8) from an explicit population genetic model, the same
results can be obtained using the tools of path analysis (Wright, 1920; Shipley, 2000). Briefly,
path analysis in natural selection is a multiple regression tool used to measure the causal effect of
genetics, environment influences, and other variables on fitness. A path analysis diagram connects
each causal variable to an effect variable via a directed edge. The strength of such effects is
measured by the path (or partial regression) coefficients that label each edge; unlabeled edges have
coefficients that can be neglected since they are common to each path. Figure 1 shows the path
analysis diagram for the population genetic model described in this section.
4. Applications
The discrete action and population genetics models developed above show that an interaction
between responsiveness and relatedness emerges naturally when considering the effect of selection
on a plastic social behavior. Below, we illustrate the importance of the interaction between re-
sponsiveness and relatedness in four ways: first, we show that neglecting the interaction leads to
incorrect predictions of the level of cooperation through the b/c ratio and argue that past efforts
to synthesize mechanisms for cooperation within species and for mutualisms between species have
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neglected this interaction; second, we show how the interaction between responsiveness and related-
ness can be important in interspecific interactions, such as mutualisms; third, we extend the discrete
action model to include non-additive or synergistic payoffs and demonstrate how responsiveness,
relatedness, and synergy interact; and fourth, we use the population genetic model to derive a
stability condition that reveals how proximate mechanisms evolve in the long run only when they
generate enough responsiveness relative to the break even point determined by relatedness and the
ecological costs and benefits of the behavior (i.e. S = 0).
4.1. The interaction between reciprocity and relatedness
The interaction between responsiveness (i.e., reciprocity) and relatedness in equation (7) natu-
rally breaks into two components: −c(n−1)rρ represents the cost to a focal individual of increasing
its own level of helping in response to the intrinsic increase in the level of helping of related group
mates; and b(n− 1)(n− 2)rρ represents the benefit the focal individual receives from third parties
that increase their level of helping in response to the intrinsic increase in the level of helping of
the focal individual’s related group mates. Both of these components are due essentially to the
ability of individuals to respond to the actions of the focal’s related group mates. Neglecting these
responses generates
b
c
>
1
r + ρ
(9)
as the condition for an increase in cooperation. Condition (9), which lacks the products of relat-
edness and responsiveness present in condition (8), effectively assumes that related group mates of
the focal individual do not respond plastically to other individuals whereas unrelated individuals
can respond plastically. This assumption is very restrictive, which suggests that condition (9) is
incorrect in most cases.
To visualize how neglecting the interaction between responsiveness and relatedness affects pre-
dicted levels of cooperation, we plot in Figure 2 the error of the incorrect expression in (9) relative to
the correct b/c expression in (8) as a function of responsiveness. For pairwise interactions (n = 2),
the relative error is always greater than zero regardless of the value of relatedness, which implies
that neglecting the interaction between relatedness and responsiveness leads to an overestimate of
the level of cooperation. This is the case because the neglected interaction consists only of the cost
the focal individual pays to respond to its relatives, −c(n − 1)rρ. For larger interaction groups
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(n > 2), the interaction effect of third parties comes into play, b(n− 1)(n− 2)rρ. This leads to an
underestimate of the level of cooperation (relative error less than zero) for small values of respon-
siveness and relatedness and an overestimate for large values of either factor. Thus, in precisely the
situation where cooperation is expected to be low (both low relatedness and low responsiveness),
the interaction between responsiveness and relatedness increases cooperation.
Although an interaction between responsiveness and relatedness is a generic and important
component of selection on social behavior as we have argued above, it can easily be neglected in
efforts to synthesize different mechanisms of assortment when those efforts do not systematically
track all of the effects of plastic responses. Here, we give two examples of such efforts in an attempt
to clarify how future syntheses can incorporate all the effects of different assortment mechanisms,
whether they derive from behavioral plasticity within a generation or from demographic mechanisms
operating across generations. The first example is an “expanded Hamilton’s rule” presented by
Queller (2011, equation 1) as the following inequality
− c+
∑
i
bi ri +
∑
i
di si +
∑
i
mi fi > 0 , (10)
where c is the cost of a cooperative act to the focal individual, bi is the benefit accruing to the i-th
relative of the focal individual, ri the relatedness coefficient between the focal individual and the
i-th relative. The third and fourth terms represent an expansion of the classical Hamilton’s rule
to include multiplicative effects and behavioral feedbacks, which Queller calls “kind” and “kith”
selection, respectively. Of these terms, kind selection (
∑
i disi) involves a coefficient quantifying
the deviation from additivity, di for the i-th interaction partner, which is a “synergistic” fitness
effect, and a synergy regression coefficient si. Finally, the last term (
∑
i fimi) is the product of
a coefficient measuring how the i-th social partner’s phenotype responds to the focal individual’s
phenotype, fi, and the fitness effect of this response mi. Queller suggests that this expansion
of the phenotypic version of Hamilton’s rule represents more types of fitness effects in a causal
manner than the classical form, and therefore might lead to better disentangling of the various
pathways through which selection acts on social behaviors. While we agree with the basic premise,
we show below that equation (10) lacks the interaction between relatedness and responsiveness and
is therefore correct only under restrictive assumptions.
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To see this, we simplify equation (10) by dropping the “kind” selection component (i.e. setting
d = 0) and obtain
− c+ b r +mf > 0 (11)
for the case where there is a single class of individuals (i = 1 in equation (10)). In condition (11), the
kith selection feedback coefficient, f , is analogous to our behavioral responsiveness measure ρ. If we
let the kith fitness effect m be equal to the fitness effect for kin, b, then condition (11) immediately
becomes condition (9) that we evaluated above that lacks the interaction between responsiveness
and relatedness. The lack of this interaction stems from Queller’s assumption, without any explicit
justification, that the behavioral feedbacks and indirect fitness effects can be decomposed additively.
This assumption is correct only under very restrictive circumstances, namely when only individuals
without relatedness to the focal individual respond to the focal individual and related individuals do
not respond. In Appendix C in the Supporting Information, we show that adopting this assumption
explicitly in Queller’s framework leads to condition (9). However, in most interactions among
social partners with responsive phenotypes, both related and unrelated individuals will exhibit
behavioral feedbacks, which suggests that a generalized Hamilton’s rule that includes both kin and
kith selection cannot be constructed by simply adding the kin and kith components together.
Our second example comes from Fletcher and Doebeli (2009) who argue for the concept of
“interaction environments” as a way to measure assortment genotype and behavior, regardless of the
mechanism that generates the assortment. Fletcher and Doebeli argue that the important quantity
for determining whether cooperators proliferate more than defectors is the difference between the
average interaction environment of cooperators, ec, and that of defectors, ed, which using our
definitions of b and c yields
b
c
>
1
ec − ed . (12)
The interaction environments depend not only on the genetic assortment probabilities, rc and rd,
but also on how much each genotype ends up playing C and D against other intrinsic cooperators
and defectors, respectively. For intrinsic cooperators, ec = rc + (1− rc)(q+ (1− q)(pi1 +pi3)), where
pii is the ith element of the stationary distribution of outcomes given in equation (1), so the last
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term is simply the sum of the fraction of games between a C- and D-type where the outcome is
(C,C) and (D,C) at the stationary distribution. Similarly, ed = (1 − rd)q(pi1 + pi2). Substituting
these expressions for ec and ed into condition (12) yields
b
c
>
1− ρcρd
rc(1− ρd)(1− q) + rdq(1− ρc) + ρd(1− ρc) + q(ρc − ρd) , (13)
which simplifies to
b
c
>
1 + ρ
r + ρ
(14)
when ρc = ρd = ρ and rc = rd = r. Comparing this expression with condition (6), we can see that
it is not the correct condition for an increase in cooperation as it lacks the interaction between
relatedness and responsiveness in the numerator. The reason the interaction environment method
does not produce the correct interaction term rρ is because reciprocity and other types of behavioral
responses affect a focal genotype’s fitness not only through changing the social environment a
genotype experiences, but also through changing the phenotype expressed by the focal genotype
in response to this social environment. Therefore, the implication that behavioral responses and
genetic relatedness are only two special cases of the same fundamental assortment quantity does
not hold in general since different assortment mechanisms can interact.
4.2. Reciprocity and synergy
In the above analyses, and in many biological models of social interactions, the marginal costs
and benefits of cooperation and defection for the focal individual do not depend on the genotype of
its partner. However, it is often plausible that cooperators might obtain an extra benefit (or cost)
from interacting with other cooperators, and this benefit (or cost) is called positive (or negative)
synergy. The importance of synergy, and non-additive interactions more generally, in understanding
the evolution of social behavior was demonstrated by Queller in his seminal papers (1984; 1985).
Since then, many studies have emphasized the positive and negative synergies can relax or con-
strain, respectively, the condition for cooperative behaviors to increase in frequency (Queller, 1992b;
Fletcher and Zwick, 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a,b; Taylor and Nowak,
2007; Ohtsuki, 2012; Taylor and Maciejewski, 2012). If positive synergies are strong enough, they
can also change the structure of the evolutionary game (Fletcher and Zwick, 2006; Hauert et al.,
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2006; Taylor and Nowak, 2007), which might turn a Prisoner’s Dilemma game into a Stag-Hunt
game.
Since repeated interactions, such as reciprocity and behavioral responses, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game can also stabilize cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986),
these interactions can also be viewed as changing the structure of the one-shot evolutionary game
(Fletcher and Zwick, 2006; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Andre´ and Day, 2007; Taylor and Nowak,
2007; Akc¸ay et al., 2009; Akc¸ay and Roughgarden, 2011). In particular, Fletcher and Zwick (2006)
show that reciprocity can alter the evolutionary game matrix to produce a game with non-additive
payoffs. Going in the other direction, Marshall and Rowe (2003) and Marshall (2009) study the
evolution of behavioral responses in a particular non-additive game matrix. Notwithstanding these
few studies, the interaction between behavioral responses and synergy has received no systematic
study. Here, we show how behavioral responses and synergy have distinct effects on the dynamics of
social traits and map the changes in the structure of the social game induced by both mechanisms
simultaneously.
As is customary in models of synergy, we modify the Prisoner’s Dilemma game from Section 2
by adding a constant d to the payoffs of both individuals when they both cooperate. When d > 0,
two cooperators produce more benefit together than twice the benefit of a single cooperator; when
d < 0, they produce less. These cases relate to cooperative acts by the partners being strategic
complements versus substitutes, respectively, as defined in economics (Bulow et al., 1985).
Using the same methodology as in section 2, we calculate the expected payoff to an intrinsic
cooperator when paired with an intrinsic defector and an intrinsic defector against an intrinsic
cooperator as
wCD =
(1− ρc) ((bρd − c)(1− ρcρd) + dρd(1− ρc))
(1− ρcρd)2 and
wDC =
(1− ρc) ((b− ρdc)(1− ρcρd) + dρd(1− ρc))
(1− ρcρd)2 ,
(15)
respectively. These expressions indicate that reciprocity and payoff synergism can interact in com-
plex ways. To better illustrate this interaction, suppose that both types of players have the same
probability of reciprocation, ρc = ρd = ρ, and the same probability of assortment, rc = rd = r.
Then, as shown in Appendix A in the Supporting Information, the component that the payoff
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synergy, d, adds to the condition for cooperation to increase, WC −WD > 0, is
d
(
p+ r(1− p) + ρ(1− 2p)(1− r)
(1 + ρ)2
)
. (16)
Here, the first component, p + r(1 − p), matches previous work on synergy without reciprocity
(Wenseleers, 2006; Lehmann and Keller, 2006b). The first thing to note from (16) is that, compared
with the non-synergistic case in condition (6), synergy adds frequency dependence to the increase
condition. This is a well-known result (Grafen, 1979; Queller, 1984; Lehmann and Keller, 2006b;
Gardner et al., 2007; Ohtsuki, 2012; Taylor and Maciejewski, 2012) that complicates the analysis of
synergy. Essentially, this frequency dependence arises from explicitly accounting for the frequency of
different discrete pairings, which is necessary when payoffs are not additive. Another way of thinking
about this frequency dependence is that while relatedness or genetic assortment generally accounts
for pairwise genetic correlations, accounting for synergy requires calculating triplet correlations,
which are generally much more tedious to calculate (Ohtsuki, 2012, for example). Notably, this
frequency dependence can be eliminated in certain stochastic models with symmetric mutation
and weak selection (e.g., Tarnita et al., 2009; Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013) even in the case of
synergistic payoffs.
Second, the evolutionary game defined by the expected payoffs from the repeated game, wCC ,
wCD, wDC , and wDD, will take on different game structures depending on the values of d and ρ.
Figure 3 illustrates the different possibilities. With ρ < c/b, a high enough synergism can transform
the game from a Prisoner’s Dilemma into a Stag-Hunt (coordination) game, which will have two
evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs): all cooperators or all defectors. If ρ > 0, then still higher
d can turn the game into a Mutualism game, where intrinsic cooperators have an unconditional
advantage. When ρ > c/b, the possibility of generating a coordination game disappears, and in-
creasing d turns the Prisoner’s Dilemma into a Hawk-Dove game (anti-coordination or Snowdrift
game) and eventually into a Mutualism game as d increases further. To our knowledge, the interac-
tion between reciprocity and synergy demonstrated in Figure 3 has not been previously recognized.
This interaction is particularly important in the light of recent results that show that non-additivity
by itself does not change the conditions for the evolution of cooperation in populations with ho-
mogenous spatial structure (Ohtsuki, 2012), unless it changes the structure of the evolutionary
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game.
4.3. The evolution of reciprocity
While the discrete-action model allows us to derive intuitive relationships between relatedness,
reciprocity, and synergy, it assumes a specific mechanism of repeated interactions that resembles
tit-for-tat or direct reciprocity. In contrast, the population genetic model in section 3, where
investments in cooperation are continuous, can handle families (in the mathematical sense) of
flexible behavioral responses. In this section, we discuss how to analyze the evolutionary stability
of such behavioral response families.
In our population genetic approach, how individuals act and how responsive they are to their
partners’ actions are both functions of the phenotype (p) describing the proximate behavioral
mechanism (see Figure 1). Mechanistic examples of this phenotype p could include the level of
connectivity between particular brain regions or the sensitivity of particular neurons to neuromod-
ulators such as oxytocin. Alternatively, one can think of p at the functional level where it might
represent, for example, the strength of an other-regarding preference individuals have towards their
social partners (Akc¸ay et al., 2009). Regardless of whether the phenotype p is measured at the
mechanistic or functional level, its role in our model is to provide a mechanism that connects how
individuals act to how they respond to the actions of others. Specifically, the phenotype (and
the behavioral mechanism associated with it) implicitly defines a function ρ(a) that measures the
responsiveness level of an individual as a function of the action a of its social partners when those
partners are monomorphic for the phenotype. For instance, since more intense other-regarding
preferences produce both higher investments in a group and more responsive individuals, ρ(a) is
an increasing function as depicted by the solid black curve in Figure 4.
Now, we can use the first order condition for evolutionary stability (S = 0 in (7)), to solve for
the responsiveness level ρ that is necessary to make a given action a evolutionarily stable at a given
relatedness value r. In this way, the first order evolutionary stability condition S = 0 defines another
set of curves (one for each value of relatedness) that maps actions, a, to responsiveness, ρ (dashed
curves in Figure 4). Then, the intersection of the ρ(a) curve obtained from the proximate mechanism
and the curve obtained by setting S = 0 gives the evolutionarily stable value of the action and
the phenotype that produces it. Note that different phenotypes for a single proximate behavioral
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mechanism or wholly different mechanisms will both in general generate different functions ρ(a)
and therefore different evolutionarily stable phenotypes and social behaviors.
Another important result our population genetic model yields concerns whether populations
can evolve towards these evolutionarily stable phenotypes when they start from neighboring ones
(Eshel and Motro, 1981; Eshel, 1983; Taylor, 1989). This kind of evolutionary stability, called
convergence stability, is often more important in the long-term evolution of continuous phenotypes
than the traditional notion of strict evolutionary stability (Wakano and Lehmann, 2012). A can-
didate phenotypic value is convergence stable when the derivative of d∆q/dδ with respect to the
resident phenotypic value p is negative (Taylor, 1989). This condition amounts to
d
dp
[
d∆q
dδ
]
S=0
∝
[
da
dp
(
dρ
da
∂S
∂ρ
+
db
da
∂S
∂b
+
dc
da
∂S
∂c
)]
S=0
< 0 , (17)
where the derivatives in (17) are evaluated at S = 0 and measure how ρ, b, and c change due to both
direct and indirect changes in the phenotype p and the resulting actions a. Even in this generic
form, condition (17) tells us that the evolutionary stability of a phenotype depends on how a change
in the phenotype and the resulting action affects the level of responsiveness and how responsiveness
changes selection for that phenotype. In other words, it is not only the level of responsiveness that
matters, but also how the underlying phenotype changes responsiveness and how responsiveness in
turn alters the selection gradient.
More practically, the convergence stability condition can be interpreted graphically as in Figure
4. With a little algebra and assuming dadp > 0 (a natural assumption if p measures a cooperation
phenotype and a the level of investment in cooperation), condition (17) becomes
[
dρ(a)
da
]
S=0
<
dρS=0
da
(18)
where
[
dρ
da
]
S=0
measures the slope of the behavioral mechanism ρ(a) where it crosses the evolu-
tionary stability curve (S = 0) and dρS=0da is the slope of the evolutionary stability curve at that
same point. In other words, condition (18) implies that, in Figure 4, the curve generated by the
behavioral mechanism, ρ(a), must cross the evolutionary stability curve, S = 0, from above. Values
of ρ and a on the S = 0 curve can be thought of as the actions that result from phenotypes that
19
generate a level of responsiveness that exactly balances the costs and benefits of the behavior. Thus,
a behavioral mechanism that crosses the S = 0 curve from above is one that generates marginally
more responsiveness than what is required to exactly balance the costs and benefits, and this is
what makes it possible for evolution to converge to such a behavioral mechanism. Importantly, the
location of the S = 0 curve will depend on relatedness. For Prisoner’s Dilemma type interactions
(b(n− 1) > c > 0), both ∂S/∂r > 0 and ∂S/∂ρ > 0, which means that the S = 0 curve shifts down
as relatedness increases. In Figure 4, we plot two S = 0 curves for hypothetical values of related-
ness, r1 < r2, and its clear from the figure that increasing relatedness increases the convergence
stable level of responsiveness for the proximate behavioral mechanism given by ρ(a).
4.4. Interspecific mutualisms
In Appendix D, we illustrate how the methodology of Section 3 and Appendix B in the Support-
ing Information can be applied to symbiosis (especially mutualistic ones) where host and symbiont
phenotypes respond to each other and where both species exist in structured populations (Foster
and Wenseleers, 2006; Akc¸ay and Simms, 2011; Akc¸ay, in review). Our results show that both
the host and symbiont population structure (characterized by within- and between-species genetic
association coefficients) and phenotypic responses interact in previously unrecognized, non-additive
ways (compare for example, with Foster and Wenseleers, 2006). This reinforces our main point,
namely that phenotypic responses and genetic associations need to be considered in a consistent
framework to be accurately integrated. In the interest of space, we refer the reader to Appendix D
in the Supporting Information for the details of the model and the results.
5. Discussion
One of the major goals of evolutionary and behavioral ecology is to elucidate the causal biolog-
ical pathways that drive the evolution of social traits. However, natural selection rarely operates
through a single pathway, and therefore the various causal components of social evolution need
to be integrated and their commonalities and interactions explored. Our main goal in this paper
is to contribute to this synthesis effort. In so doing, we highlight that genetic assortment, be-
havioral responses, and non-additive interactions between phenotypes all have both distinct and
interacting effects. Therefore, combining these components requires explicit and consistent model-
ing approaches. Using a model based on discrete phenotypes and a population-genetic model based
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on continuous phenotypes, we obtain the following results.
(i) Phenotypic assortment is not a univariate quantity: it matters how much assortment comes
from both behavioral responses and genetic assortment. Further, behavioral responses and genetic
assortment cannot simply be added to each other, even when social interactions (payoffs) are
additive. Rather, they interact with each other both additively and multiplicatively. Prior results
analogous to this can be found in Lehmann and Keller (2006a), McGlothlin et al. (2010) and
Akc¸ay and Van Cleve (2012). Yet, despite this interaction being known for some time, its crucial
role seems to be not widely appreciated. Akc¸ay and Van Cleve (2012) is the first paper to our
knowledge to highlight the synergistic and symmetric effect of genetic assortment and behavioral
responses on the response to selection of social phenotypes in social groups of any size. In that work,
we demonstrated how synergism between genetic assortment and behavioral responses can facilitate
the transfer of fitness effects from the within-group level to the between-group level, a crucial step
in evolutionary transitions in individuality (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995; Michod, 2005).
These previous results assumed continuous phenotypes and within-species interactions; here we
show that a similar synergism between genetic assortment and behavioral responses is found for
discrete phenotypes and is important for species interactions as well.
(ii) Non-additive or synergistic interactions can have important effects on whether cooperative
behaviors increase in frequency in a population and whether these effects depend on behavioral
responses and reciprocity. Specifically, synergy and reciprocity can both change the structure of
the evolutionary game (Taylor and Nowak, 2007). When this game starts as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
where cooperation is unconditional, increasing synergy or responsiveness levels can stabilize some
level of cooperation. However, whether all individuals cooperate fully depends on the combination
of synergy and responsiveness that determines whether the game becomes a Stag-Hunt, Mutualism,
or Hawk-Dove game (cf. Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013).
Even though synergistic interactions are easy to study using a discrete phenotypic model, the
population-genetic model with continuous phenotypes shows the importance of non-additive payoffs
or fitness in more subtle way. These interactions will affect the evolutionary (convergence) stability
of a phenotype and how the stable phenotype changes with underlying parameters. The former
effect can be seen in equation (17), which shows that non-additivity in the benefits and costs of a
21
social phenotype (behavior) appear in the convergence stability condition (since b and c are them-
selves already first-order derivatives of fertility). Non-additivity in benefits and costs relate directly
to ecological mechanisms that convert the effort of individuals in the social interaction into payoffs
in terms of fertility or survival. For example, individuals who put effort into a group hunt (Skyrms,
2001) may receive more return in terms of the amount of prey item per unit of caloric investment
when more individuals join the hunt. This kind of ecological synergy, or “complementarity” in
economics (Bulow et al., 1985), can have large effects on the level of investment in cooperative
interactions both within groups (Akc¸ay et al., 2009) and in structured populations (Akc¸ay and
Van Cleve, 2012; Cornforth et al., 2012).
(iii) There is a simple graphical relationship required for specific proximate behavioral mech-
anisms (e.g., social preferences, social norms, punishment, etc.) to be evolutionarily stable in the
long run. When plotting the curve of responsiveness as a function of the evolving phenotype for
the mechanism (level of other regard, strength of conformity, probability of punishment, etc), this
curve must cross the curve that balances the costs and benefits of the behavior from above. More-
over, since different levels of relatedness result in different curves that balance benefit and cost,
what level of responsiveness evolves for a specific proximate mechanism can also be determined
graphically.
5.1. Empirical issues
The empirical study of the interplay between behavioral responses and genetic assortment and
the role of synergistic payoffs is still relatively new. Most of the recent work linking behavioral
responses and genetic assortment comes from the application of indirect genetic effect (IGE) models
to laboratory, agricultural, and field-based populations (e.g. Moore et al., 2002; Petfield et al., 2005;
Mutic and Wolf, 2007; Ellen et al., 2008; Danielson-Franc¸ois et al., 2009; Bleakley and Brodie, 2009;
Teplitsky et al., 2010; Fre`re et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2011; Hamilton and Ligocki, 2012). IGE
models (Moore et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1999; McGlothlin et al., 2010) extend classical quantitative
genetics (Lynch and Walsh, 1998) to include a coefficient, ψ, that measures the effect of a social
partner’s phenotype on the phenotype of a focal individual. Importantly, the IGE coefficient ψ
directly maps onto our behavioral responsiveness coefficient ρ (Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012) and
is thus also a measure of reciprocity. We know from equation (7) (and analogously equation
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18 in McGlothlin et al. 2010) that an interaction between behavioral responses and relatedness is
important for selection on social traits, even when no such interaction is assumed to affect individual
phenotypes (see equation C.5 in the Supporting Information or equation 5 in (McGlothlin et al.,
2010)). However, most of the empirical work to date spends little time on the interaction of
behavioral responses and relatedness with the notable exceptions of Bleakley and Brodie (2009)
and Fre`re et al. (2010). Moreover, some empirical work assumes an explicit interaction term in
the regression model for individual phenotypes, and it is not yet clear how empirical estimates of
this interaction can be tied to the predicted interaction term that arises in measures of selection
on the trait. Thus, more work needs to be done understanding the interaction between behavioral
responses and relatedness both theoretically and empirically.
Empirical studies explicitly focused on non-additive payoffs are uncommon (Queller et al., 2003;
Gore et al., 2009, are notable exceptions). This paucity of studies does not reflect the importance
of non-additive interactions in nature. Instead, non-additive and non-linear interactions are likely
to be abundant and their effects strong. For example, in parental care, many arguments implicitly
or explicitly rely on the contributions of each parent combining non-additively (e.g., Winkler, 1987;
Akc¸ay and Roughgarden, 2009). We suggest that measuring non-additive interactions at both the
payoff (fertility or survival) and fitness levels will prove important for explaining the evolution of
social behaviors, regardless of whether the phenotypes in question vary continuously or are discrete
characters with large effects.
To conclude, a careful analysis of behavioral responses, genetic assortment, and non-additive
interactions shows a complex interaction between these three pathways. We believe that focusing
on this complexity will ultimately deliver a more complete and nuanced understanding of the
evolutionary forces shaping social behaviors. The necessary mathematical framework for such
understanding exists, though as we show in this paper, it needs to be applied with some care.
Once crafted, these theories can be tested against the growing abundance of sophisticated datasets
that measure both networks of social interactions and important demographic and fitness-related
variables (e.g. Holekamp et al., 2012; Apicella et al., 2012).
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Appendix A: Two-player game with synergy
We follow the discrete-action model defined in section 2. Individuals are either intrinsic cooper-
ators or intrinsic defectors who can either play their intrinsic strategy or reciprocate their partner’s
last action. Let ρc and ρd be the probabilities that an intrinsic cooperator and defector, respec-
tively, reciprocate or copy their partner’s last action. We allow for non-random interactions among
intrinsic cooperators and intrinsic defectors that might result from population structure or other
assortation mechanisms and define rc and rd to be the probabilities that intrinsic cooperators and
defectors, respectively, interact among themselves non-randomly. Two cooperators who play each
other each earn payoff b − c + d, where b is the benefit, c is the cost of cooperation, and d is a
synergy term that accounts for non-additive payoffs. A cooperator and defector playing together
results in a payoff of −c for the cooperator and b for the defector. Two defectors playing each other
each earn zero payoff. Given this setup and following the analysis of section 2, the payoffs to an
intrinsic cooperator paired with an intrinsic defector and vice-versa are
wCD =
(1− ρc) ((bρd − c)(1− ρcρd) + dρd(1− ρc))
(1− ρcρd)2 and
wDC =
(1− ρc) ((b− ρdc)(1− ρcρd) + dρd(1− ρc))
(1− ρcρd)2 ,
respectively, which are also given in equation (15) in the main text.
We can plug the above values for wCD and wDC , along with wCC = b − c + d and wDD = 0,
into the expression for fitness in equation (4) to derive the condition for cooperation to increase,
WC −WD > 0, which simplifies to
b
(
pρc + (1− p)ρd + rc(1− p)(1− ρd) + rdp(1− ρc)− ρcρd
1− ρcρd
)
−c
(
1− (1− p)ρc − pρd + (1− p)rcρc(1− ρd) + rdpρd(1− ρc)
1− ρcρd
)
+d
(
(p+ rc(1− p))(1− ρd)
(
1− ρ2cρd
)
+ (1− p+ prd)(1− ρc)2ρd
(1− ρcρd)2
)
> 0 .
(A.1)
This expression simplifies to condition (5) when d = 0. Another simplification is to assume that
the reciprocation and assortment probabilities are the same for cooperators and defectors, namely
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ρc = ρd = ρ and rc = rd = r. In this case, expression (A.1) simplifies to
b
r + ρ
1 + ρ
− c1 + rρ
1 + ρ
+ d
(
(p+ r(1− p)) + ρ(1− 2p)(1− r)
(1 + ρ)2
)
> 0 , (A.2)
which in turn simplifies to condition (6) when d = 0.
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Appendix B: Allele frequency change in a class-structured model
Suppose that there are K classes in the population, where an individual k’s class could represent
the local population it lives in, its age or developmental stage, its sex, or some other phenotypic
feature. Each class contains Nk individuals and the total population size is N =
∑
kNk. In order
to track allele frequencies in different classes, we let q = (. . . , qjk, . . .) be a column vector of length
N where qjk is the frequency of the allele in individual k in class j. Average allele frequencies in
each class in the next time period are calculated by multiplying a transition matrix W = [wijk]
times q, where wijk is the probability that an allele in a random individual in class i descended
from individual k in class j. The transition matrix is a function of the fitnesses of each class and the
transmission processes, such as segregation, mutation, and migration, that affect how alleles move
between classes. Fitness can include both fertility and survival, and thus populations with both
overlapping and nonoverlapping generations are possible. We assume that the fitness of individual
k in class j is function of its phenotype, pjk, and potentially the phenotypes of its social partners.
In the simplest cases, phenotype depends on genotype in a linear way where pjk = p+ qjkδ and δ is
a measure of how much the mutant differs from the resident phenotype p. For non-additive genetic
interactions (such as dominance or epistasis), phenotype depends on genotype in a nonlinear way
(Gardner et al., 2007).
Calculating ∆q requires us to average the class frequencies in such a way that the average
frequency remains constant in the absence of natural selection. The appropriate weights for this
average are the reproductive values of each class (Fisher, 1930; Leslie, 1948; Taylor, 1990), α =
(. . . , αk, . . .). Thus, the change in the reproductive value weighted allele frequency is
∆q = α ·W · q− α ·N · q (B.1)
where N is a K×N matrix used to create class averages of the allele frequencies q and whose k-th
row has the value 1/Nk in the columns 1 +
∑k−1
l=1 Nl to
∑k
l=1Nl and zero elsewhere for all k. Using
equation (B.1), the derivative of ∆q with respect to δ is given by
d∆q
dδ
= α · dW
dδ
· q =
K∑
i,j,l=1
Nj∑
k=1
Nl∑
m=1
αi
∂wijk
∂plm
qjkqlm (B.2)
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The components of equation (B.2) are reproductive value, αi, the effect of one individual’s pheno-
type on another individual’s probability of transmitting an allele from one generation to the next,
∂wijk
∂plm
, and the probability that those two individuals both have the mutant allele, qjkqlm. When
this last component, qjkqlm, is averaged over all individuals in a class, we obtain a genetic identity
probability that can be related to identity by descent probabilities from classic population genetics
(Rousset and Billiard, 2000; Rousset and Ronce, 2004; Rousset, 2004) that emerge as more com-
mon quantities such as FST (Wright, 1949) in simple models of population subdivision (Rousset,
2004) such as the island model (Wright, 1931). Moreover, these genetic identity probabilities corre-
spond to the genetic covariance terms found in regression models in social evolution (Frank, 1997),
which when normalized by genetic variance correspond to the regression definition of relatedness
(Hamilton, 1972; Queller, 1992a).
Recall that the Taylor series is expanded around δ = 0, so the partial derivatives
∂wijk
∂plm
in (B.2)
are evaluated at neutrality where natural selection on fertility differences is absent. Additionally,
δ = 0 implies that all individuals in a class are equivalent, which means that the partial derivatives
above fall into three cases: the first case is the effect of a focal individual’s phenotype on its own
probability of sending an allele to class j in the next generation from its own class i,
∂wij
∂pj• ; the
second is the effect on that probability of another individual’s phenotype from the same class as
the focal,
∂wij
∂pj◦ ; and the third is the effect on that probability of the phenotype of an individual
in a different class than the focal individual,
∂wij
∂pl
where l 6= j. Substituting these derivatives into
(B.2), we obtain
α · dW
dδ
· q =
K∑
i,j=1
αiNj
∂wij
∂pj•
q2j• + (Nj − 1)
∂wij
∂pj◦
qj•qj◦ +
∑
l 6=j
Nl
∂wij
∂pl
qjql
 . (B.3)
Further, we assume that the phenotype only affects fertility f (though it could affect survival
or demographic factors such as carrying capacity or dispersal rates), which means the derivatives
in the right-hand side of (B.3) can be split into two components, the effect of the phenotype on
fertility and the effect of fertility on the probability an allele in class i descends from class j, wij .
The latter derivatives we represent with τ where τij,j• =
∂wij
∂fij• , τij,j◦ =
∂wij
∂fij◦ , and τij,l =
∂wij
∂fil
for
l 6= j. These derivatives essentially contain transmission probabilities due to dispersal, mutation,
allelic segregation, age-dependent mortality, etc, and we assume they are independent of phenotype.
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Given these two classes of derivatives,
∂wijk
∂plm
=

∂wij
∂pj• = τij,j•
∂fij
∂pj• + (Nj − 1)τij,j◦
∂fij
∂pj◦ for (l,m) = (j, k)
∂wij
∂pj◦ = τij,j•
∂fij
∂pj◦ + τij,j◦
(
∂fij
∂pj• + (Nj − 2)
∂fij
∂pj◦
)
for l = j and m 6= k
∂wij
∂pl
= τij,l
(
∂fil
∂pl• + (Nl − 1)
∂fil
∂pl◦
)
for l 6= j .
(B.4)
Finally, we assume that the effect of phenotype on fertility is independent of the source or
destination classes of the offspring; that is, we can define −C = ∂fij∂pj• =
∂f
∂p• and B =
∂fij
∂pj◦ =
∂f
∂p◦ .
Combining C and B with (B.4) into equation (B.3) results in
α · dW
dδ
· q =− C
 K∑
i,j=1
αiNj
τij,j•q2j• + (Nj − 1)τij,j◦qj•qj◦ +∑
l 6=j
Nlτij,lqjql

B
 K∑
i,j=1
αiNj(Nj − 1)
(
τij,j•q2j• + (τij,j• + (Nj − 2)τij,j◦) qj•qj◦
)
+Nj
∑
l 6=j
Nl(Nl − 1)τij,lqjql

=KC (−C + rB) ,
(B.5)
where KC and KB equal the first and second bracket in (B.5), respectively. Scaled relatedness is
given r = KB/KC . The terms in parentheses on the last line of (B.5) are the same as the right-hand
side of equation (7), once C and B are evaluated following the assumptions in that section that
the phenotype p is a parameter of some physiological/psychological mechanism that affects the
underlying actions individuals choose, a∗, and the marginal effect of the action of one individual on
the action of another is ρ. A detailed exposition of this analysis is given by Akc¸ay and Van Cleve
(2012) where −C corresponds to ∂Fi∂pi in equation (2) and B to
∂Fi
∂pj
in equation (3) in that paper.
In most biological cases of interest, KC > 0, which results in the proportionality in equation (7).
The convergence stability condition in (17) can be derived from equation (7) simply by recalling
the assumption that the phenotype affects fertility but not demographic quantities contained in r.
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Appendix C: Uni-directional and bi-directional reciprocity in indirect genetic
effects models
In this section, we will show that: (i) assuming a uni-directional type of reciprocity where the
focal individual can affect its partner’s phenotype, but not vice-versa, can lead to the expanded
Hamilton’s rule presented by Queller (2011, equation 1); and (ii) bi-directional reciprocity leads to
condition (6), which is equivalent to results derived by us (Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012) and others
(Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; McGlothlin et al., 2010). Notation in the following equations is taken
from Queller (2011) and generally follows quantitative genetic approaches to social evolution (e.g.,
Queller, 1992b; Frank, 1997; Queller, 2011) with a particular focus on the methods in indirect
genetic effect (IGE) models (Moore et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1999; McGlothlin et al., 2010).
We begin with the phenotypic version of Hamilton’s rule, derived from the Price equation (Price,
1970), that is equation (7) in Queller (2011), which is
βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
Cov [G,P ′]
Cov[G,P ]
. (C.1)
where we use primes to denote variables associated with the social partner. Suppose that the
phenotype of the social partner is defined as
P ′ = G′ + βP ′PP + ′ , (C.2)
which says that the phenotype of the social partner is a linear function of its average breeding value
(G′), the effect of the phenotype of the focal (βP ′PP ), and a random component with mean zero
(′, a standard assumption in quantitative genetics; see Lynch and Walsh, 1998). Suppose also that
the phenotype of focal individual is given by
P = G+  , (C.3)
which says the phenotype of the focal individual is a linear function only of its breeding value
and a random component; thus, there is no effect of the partner’s phenotype on the focal, which
embodies the assumption we believe underlies Queller (2011)’s analysis. Plugging P and P ′ given
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in equations (C.2) and (C.3) into equation (C.1) yields
βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
Cov [G,G′ + βP ′PP + ′]
Cov[G,G+ ]
= βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P (βP ′P + βG′G) , (C.4)
which can be written as
−c+ b(ρ+ r)
in the notation of the main text and is equivalent to the additive combination of kin and kith
components in equation (1) of Queller (2011).
To include bi-directional reciprocity, we follow the analysis presented by McGlothlin et al.
(2010); Akc¸ay and Van Cleve (2012) obtain the same results and present a comparison of the
relative merits of the current approach and the IGE approach. We start by setting
P = G+ βPP ′P
′ +  , (C.5)
which expresses the fact that P ′ also has an effect on P . Before we can plug this definition of P
or the definition of P ′ into equation (7) of Queller (2011), we must insert our definition of P ′ into
(C.5) and our definition of P into (C.2) and solve the resulting equations; the solutions are
P =
G+ + βPP ′ (G
′ + ′)
1− βPP ′βP ′P
P ′ =
G′ + ′ + βP ′P (G+ )
1− βPP ′βP ′P .
(C.6)
These solutions can be compared to the analogous solution in McGlothlin et al. (2010) (equation
6). Plugging equations (C.6) into equation (7) of Queller (2011) yields
βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
Cov
[
G,
G′+′+βP ′P (G+)
1−βPP ′βP ′P
]
Cov
[
G,
G++βPP ′ (G′+′)
1−βPP ′βP ′P
] = βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P Cov [G,G′ + ′ + βP ′P (G+ )]
Cov [G,G+ + βPP ′ (G′ + ′)]
= βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
Cov [G,G′] + βP ′P Var[G]
Var[G] + βPP ′ Cov [G,G′]
= βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
βG′G + βP ′P
1 + βPP ′βG′G
39
Thus, the Hamilton’s rule one gets from equation (7) of Queller (2011) should be
βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P
βG′G + βP ′P
1 + βPP ′βG′G
> 0
or
(1 + βPP ′βG′G)βWP ·P ′ + βWP ′·P (βG′G + βP ′P ) > 0 . (C.7)
Assuming that βP ′P = βPP ′ , equation (C.7) becomes in our notation
−c(1 + ρr) + b(r + ρ) > 0 ,
which is exactly condition (6) from our model. This is also exactly equivalent to equation (18)
given by McGlothlin et al. (2010) for pairwise interactions once the appropriate mapping between
ρ and their IGE coefficient ψ is made (see Appendix A9 in ref Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012).
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Appendix D: Interspecific mutualisms
The interaction between responsiveness and relatedness affects not only social behavior between
individuals of the same species but it also shapes social behavior between species. We can illustrate
this by applying the population genetic model with continuous traits (Section 3 in the main text
and Appendix B) to an interaction between a population of host individuals that each interact with
a group of n symbionts. Label the investment of the host species (H) into the ith symbiont by xi
and the investment of the ith symbiont (Si) into the host by yi. The payoffs (i.e., individual fertility
as a result of investments) are denoted uH(x1, · · · , xn, y1, · · · , yn) for the host and uSi(xi, yi) for
the ith symbiont (i.e., we assume that a symbiont’s fertility is only affected by the investment it
makes into and it receives from the host).
Suppose further that the investments of both the hosts and symbionts are plastic and can change
in response to each other. As a result, all of the investment variables are joint functions of the
genotypes of the individual hosts and symbionts. Following the methodology in Section 3 (see also
Akc¸ay et al., 2009; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012), we label the host’s and symbionts’ genetically
determined phenotypes pH and pS , respectively. Recall that phenotype in this context refers
to a physiological mechanism (neurological, biochemical, etc) that alters investment levels, and
that phenotypes are directly genetically determined rather investment levels. To find the increase
condition for genotypes that result in higher investments in the mutualism, we apply equation (B.2)
once for each species while treating the partner of the other species as a non-reproductive class.
Calculating the increase condition requires the total derivative of the fertilities (uH and uS)
with respect to the host and symbiont phenotypes. For example, the change is host fertility with
respect to a change in the phenotype of symbiont j is:
duH
dpSj
=
∑
i
∂uH
∂xi
dxi
dpSj
+
∑
i
∂uH
∂yi
dyi
dpSj
∝ n [−cH + ρHSbH ] , (D.1)
where cH ≡ −∂uH∂xi , bH ≡
∂uH
∂yi
, and ρHS ≡ dydpSj / dxdpSj . The latter quantity denotes the response
of a symbiont’s investment to the change of the host’s investment into that symbiont (Foster and
Wenseleers, 2006; Akc¸ay and Simms, 2011; Akc¸ay, in review). Calculating the other total derivatives
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in the same way, we obtain the (partial) conditions for the ESS phenotypes in hosts and symbionts,
respectively, as
bH
cH
=
1 + rHS (ρS•H• + (n− 1)ρS•H◦)
ρHS + rHS (1 + (n− 1)ρSS) (D.2)
bS
cS
=
1 + rSHρHS + (n− 1)rSSρSS
ρS•H• + (n− 1)rSSρS•H◦ + rSH
, (D.3)
where rSS is the relatedness coefficient for the symbionts. The coefficients rHS and rSH measure
the genetic covariance between higher investment level phenotypes of the symbionts and the host
(relative to host and symbiont genetic variance, respectively) and are analogous to relatedness
coefficients (Frank, 1994). The conditions above are only partial ESS conditions, since the between
species genetic association coefficients are dependent on the host and symbiont phenotypes and their
fertility effects. To generate the full ESS conditions, we would need a set of equations that describe
the population dynamics of host and symbionts as a function of their investment phenotypes and
find the equilibrium values for the genetic associations in the structured population, as is done
by Frank (1994). Finally, the coefficient ρS•H• denotes how much increased investment of a focal
symbiont causes the host to increase its investment into the same symbiont, ρS•H◦ measures how
the investment in another symbiont by the host responds to a focal symbiont’s investment, and ρSS
measures the response of symbionts to each other.
Similar to the intraspecific condition for the increase of cooperative phenotypes (equation 8),
conditions (D.2) and (D.3) contain both multiplicative and additive interactions between the differ-
ent relatedness and responsiveness coefficients. Such interactions have not been fully appreciated
before (e.g., Foster and Wenseleers, 2006) and have important effects on the level of investments
that evolve in the host and symbionts. For example, hosts and symbionts that can respond plas-
tically to changes in the investment levels of one another result in higher levels of investment by
both host and symbiont and this increase is mediated by an interaction between relatedness and
responsiveness.
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Figure 1: The path analysis diagram that describes the population genetic model in section 3
where individual 1 interacts with its n−1 social partners. Actions (a) are caused by the behavioral
mechanism (p), which in turn is shaped by a heritable genetic component (additive genetic value,
g). The path coefficient r measures genetic relatedness between the focal individual and its social
partners. In the gray box, solid lines denote the effect that an individual’s behavioral phenotype
has on its own action and these paths have a coefficient of 1 (by convention). Dashed lines in the
gray box have a coefficient of ρ and represent the effect of an individual’s phenotype on the actions
of its social partners. Actions affect the fertility of the focal individual where the focal decreases
its own fertility by c and its social partners increase it by b. Finally, fertility is converted to fitness
through demographic processes. The strength of selection on the phenotype p is calculated by
multiplying all the coefficients along a path and then summing all paths. This results in equation
(7) and shows how products of relatedness and responsiveness are created.
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Figure 2: These panels plot the relative error of the b/c expression given in (9) that lacks products
of relatedness and responsiveness compared to the correct one given in (8). Group sizes n are given
in each panel. Each curve represents a different value of relatedness r where the lower curve has
r = 0.05, the middle curve r = 0.5, and the upper curve r = 0.95.
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Figure 3: The different possibilities for how a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with reciprocity and
non-additive payoffs can get transformed, depending on the probabilities of reciprocation ρ and
the non-additive payoff or synergy component d. Pure cooperation is unstable in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and pure defection is unstable in the Mutualism game. Both pure cooperation and
defection are stable in the Stag-Hunt (or coordination) game. Pure cooperation and defection are
unstable in the Hawk-Dove game leaving an intermediate level of both stable (stable mixed strategy
or polymorphism).
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Figure 4: The graphical relationship between candidate evolutionarily stable response coefficients
(ρ) as a function of individuals actions (a) and the response coefficients generated by a hypothetical
proximate mechanism that we label ρ(a). Here, actions might measure the level of helping, and
the graphed proximate mechanism generates a positive relationship between responsiveness and
actions as might be the case for individuals with an other-regarding preference for their partner’s
payoff. Candidate evolutionary stable values of ρ (independent of any proximate mechanism) and
a solve S = 0 (see equation 7) and are plotted as dashed curves for hypothetical values of b, c,
and n and for two hypothetical values of relatedness, r1 < r2. The proximate mechanism above
generates convergence stable actions, a∗1 and a∗2, since its response coefficient curve ρ(a) crosses the
S = 0 curves from above (see equation 18).
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